The analysis of risks associated with communications, and information security for a system-of-systems is a challenging endeavor. This difficulty is due to the complex interdependencies that exist in the communication and operational dimensions of the system-of-systems network, where disruptions on nodes and links can give rise to cascading failure modes. In this paper, we propose the modification of a functional dependency analysis tool, as a means of analyzing system-of-system operational and communication architectures. The goal of this research is to quantify the impact of attacks on communications, and information flows on the operability of the component systems, and to evaluate and compare different architectures with respect to their reliability and robustness under attack. Based on the topology of the network, and on the properties of the dependencies, our method quantifies the operability of each system as a function of the availability and correctness of the required input, and of the operability of the other systems in the network. The model accounts for partial capabilities and partial degradation. Robustness of the system-of-systems is evaluated in terms of its capability to maintain an adequate level of operability following a disruption in communications. Hence, different architectures can be compared based on their sensitivity to attacks, and the method can be used to guide decision both in architecting the system-of-systems and in planning updates and modifications, accounting for the impact of interdependencies on the robustness of the system-of-systems. Synthetic examples show conceptual application of the method.
Introduction
The disruption of communications and data flows has become an increasingly important factor in attacks and warfare scenarios. Modern communication systems and infrastructure are increasingly reliant on advances in cybersecurity, a discipline of increasing prominence, that requires specific research and development 1, 2 . In cybersecurity, we can define cyberspace as the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also refers to the virtual environment of information and interactions 3 . Thus, cybersecurity involves the protection and defence of technologic resources, data, and communications.
The strategy to increase cybersecurity is twofold: cyberattacks can be reduced or contained (thus making the attacks unsuccessful), or the impacts of successful cyberattacks can be reduced, by improving the resilience of systems to such attacks. One fundamental requirement to achieve the latter step is risk evaluation and impact assessment 4 . This evaluation must also account for the possible cascading effects that cyberattacks can have on the operability of a system 5 . Powell 6 gives a classification of the cascading effects, following the primary (direct) effects: secondary cascading effects, also called internal, affect distributed service within the system that is primarily distressed by the cyberattack. Tertiary cascading effects, also called external, result in the loss or degradation of operational or mission capabilities external, but dependent on the primarily affected system. This study focuses on systems-of-systems, in which the tertiary effects play a fundamental role, due to the importance of the interdependencies between the constituent systems.
System-of-systems are complex aggregate of systems where the constituent entities have, at least in part, operational and managerial independence 7, 8 . The behavior of the overall System-of-Systems depends not only on that of the single systems, but also on the interactions between the constituent systems 9, 10 . Degradation occurring in systems due to an attack may not critically damage the system itself. Instead, it may cause the emergence of critical loss of operability elsewhere in the interconnected system-of-systems 11, 12 . For this reasons, the behavior of a systemof-systems, when a component systems is subject to a cyberattack, can be very different from the behavior of the system under attack, in terms of robustness and reliability.
The consequences of attacks on the system-of-systems cannot be understood by means of the merely evaluation of the behavior of the single systems, but require an assessment of the effect of the interdependencies on the behavior of the whole system-of-systems. For this reason, we propose to modify a tool, used for functional dependency analysis in systems-of-systems, to tailor it to cyberattacks impact assessment. We model the systems-ofsystems as a network, where nodes represent the component systems and the capabilities that the system-of-systems is meant to achieve, and edges represent the operational dependencies, and the information flow. Each dependency is characterized by strength, that quantifies how much the behavior of a system depends on the behavior of another system, and criticality, that quantifies the negative impact that a system has on another, in critical conditions. Given a specific architecture, the method ranks nodes and links based on the criticality of their impact on the operability of the system-of-systems in case of attacks, accounting for partial degradation and cascading effects. Our research adds to the analysis of the behavior of individual systems, an evaluation of how interdependencies affect the behavior of the system-of-systems when attacks occur. The tool detects both positive and negative effects of the interdependencies, which can be used to guide decision about actions to undertake in order to improve the robustness of the system-of-systems.
Communication and Functional Dependency Network Analysis

Basics of Functional Dependency Network Analysis
Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) was originally formulated by Garvey and Pinto 13, 14 , who applied it to capability portfolio analysis and risk assessment. We modified FDNA modified to make it suitable to analyze interdependencies in SoS 15 , and we successfully applied it to aerospace SoS 16, 17 . In this section, we summarize the basic ideas and formulation of FDNA (for a complete description of the method, and its applications in other fields, cf. [15] , [16] , and [17] ), while in the next we describe the modifications introduced on the method, in order to tailor it to the analysis of cyberattacks.
In FDNA, the architecture of SoS is modeled as a directed network (Fig. 1 ). The nodes represent either the component systems or the capability that the SoS is meant to acquire. Accordingly, the links represent the operational dependencies between the systems or between the capabilities. Each dependency is characterized by strength (Strength of Dependency, SOD) and criticality (Criticality of Dependency, COD), that affect the behavior of the whole SoS in different ways. Strength of dependency accounts for how much the behavior of a system is affected by the behavior of a predecessor system, while criticality of dependency quantifies how the functionality of a system is degraded when a predecessor system is experiencing a major failure. Those inputs can come from expert judgment and evaluation, or may be the result of simulation and experiments. We use this method to evaluate the effect of topology, and of possible degraded functioning of one or more systems on the operability of each system in the network. The analysis can be a deterministic evaluation of a single instance of the SoS, or a stochastic quantification of the overall SoS behavior. In the deterministic analysis, given the internal health status (called Self-Effectiveness, SE) of each system, and the properties of the dependencies, FDNA quantifies the operability O i of each system, based on equations (1) - (6) . The operability of a node, ranging between 0 and 100, is defined as the "percentage" of effectiveness, that is the level at which the system is currently operating, or the level at which the desired capability is being currently achieved.
The operability of root nodes is equal to their self-effectiveness, since they are not dependent from other nodes:
The operability of nodes that have at least one predecessor is computed as the minimum of two terms, one depending on the SODs, and one depending on the CODs:
In the stochastic version of FDNA, the self-effectiveness of each system follows a probability distribution; this means that the resulting operability of the nodes is probabilistic. In the previous studies 15 , we proposed FDNA as a tool to identify the most critical nodes in the network, as well as the most important dependencies, in terms of impact on the operability when disruptions occur. The robustness of a SoS can be evaluated as the ability to reduce the loss of operability when partial failures affect one or more systems.
Evaluating the impact of cyberattacks
Based on the features of cyberattacks impact, FDNA has been modified to account for internal (primary and secondary) and external (tertiary) effects. While the concept of self-effectiveness already models the internal effects ( Fig. 2b) , as well as disruptions on the operability of a system, we added a weight on each link, called Availability of Data (AOD). This value models the effect of specific communication and data loss on a single interdependency (Fig. 2c ). This representation can also model multiple communication means. AOD can also represent partially compromised communication and data. In this case, expert judgment or simulation data can be used to generate the value of AOD that models the specific impact of the loss on the specific interdependency. Fig. 2 shows possible situations when cyberattacks internally affect a system, causing both primary/secondary and tertiary effects, and when cyberattacks affect communication links, causing tertiary effects on a subset of the systems dependent on the attacked system. In the modified version of FDNA, we change equations (4) and (6) as follows, to account for the availability of data: Preliminary results have been obtained from the analysis of an aerospace system-of-systems ( Fig. 3) , comprised of five systems: a ground station, two satellites, a UAV, and a carrier. The edges in the network represent data communication. Previous results 15 identified the ground station N1, and the satellite N4 as the most critical systems for the overall operability, when disruptions or internal cyberattacks occur. In most system-of-systems scenarios, however, the systems have better internal protection than communication links against attacks. The modified version of FDNA performs analysis of cyberattacks on the communication links. Table 1 reports the results of this analysis, where we assume that one communication link is disrupted by cyberattack so that the successor receives a reduced amount of data, corresponding to an operability of 25% (AOD=0.25) of the predecessor. The links are numbered as in Fig. 3 . Given the criticality of node N1 and N4, we would expect links 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 to be the most critical. Instead, results show that links 6 and 7 are the most critical with respect to the cascading effect on the operability of the carrier, in case of cyberattacks. While an internal disruption or attack on the ground station (N1) would result critical 15 , the architecture of the network makes the station not critical for what concerns the communication links. Conversely, while an internal disruption on the UAV system is partially absorbed thanks to the interdependencies on other systems, the communication link between the UAV and the carrier is highly critical. Satellite N4 is critical both in case of internal attack and in case of attack on the communication link to the carrier.
Results
Five-node aerospace network
The method presented in this paper can also analyze multiple attacks, as well as the effects of cyberattacks on communication links that occur simultaneously with other disruptions or internal attacks. Table 2 shows the result of attacks on the links in a scenario where the ground station is working with reduced operability. The cascading effect of attacks on links 2 and 3 is more than doubled. 
Littoral combat warfare system-of-systems
We performed analysis of the impact of cyberattacks on a littoral combat warfare system-of-systems. Fig. 4 shows the SoS as modeled in an Agent Based Model that we are currently using as a test bed for FDNA. The network must be converted into a functional dependency analysis network, to be analyzed with the FDNA tool. In the modeled scenario, the enemy units consist of five boats, five mines, and one submarine. The objective of the SoS is to detect and engage the enemies. Based on the functional dependency, we converted the network as shown in Fig. 5 . Some agents can perform both reconnaissance and attacks. We split these agents into appropriate subsystems, in order to perform FDNA analysis.
The resulting FDNA network has 35 nodes, 60 operational dependencies, and 12 communication links. In table 3, we report the result of the analysis with the modified FDNA tool. The table shows the impact of cyberattacks on specific links, one for each subsystem of the Littoral combat warfare SoS. As in the example of the five-node aerospace networks, these results give insight into the criticality of systems and communication links in case of cyberattacks, constitute a valuable basis for design, architecture, and update decisions, and suggest where to leverage more robustness and protection from cyberattacks.
Results show that a cyberattack on the communication link between the UAV and the ship in the Surface subsystem, while affecting the ship, has a minor effect on the efficacy of the surface subsystem, due to its architecture. The link to the helicopter in the anti-submarine subsystems is instead critical.
Surface subsystem
Anti-submarine subsystem Anti-mines subsystem These results suggest to modify the architecture in order to support the anti-submarine subsystem. For example, if communication is available between the ship in the anti-mine subsystem and the helicopter in the anti-mine subsystem, the impact of cyberattacks on link 3 changes with respect to the results in table 3. The loss in the engaging capability of the anti-submarine subsystem is only 25%, instead than 45%, when the same cyberattack on link 3 as that reported in table 3 occurs.
This preliminary result shows how the modified FDNA tool can be used to guide effective decision in contrasting cyberattacks, when the cascading effect of the interdependencies in a SoS, and the tertiary effects of cyberattacks are taken into account.
Conclusions and future work
We propose a modified functional dependency analysis tool as a means of analyzing the impact of cyberattacks on a system-of-systems. Evaluation of risks is a fundamental step in cybersecurity, and a system-of-systems representation of interdependent systems is suitable to model the tertiary effects of cyberattacks, i.e. the external impact that a cyberattack suffered by a system has on the other systems. Thus, we can extend the analysis of cyberattacks on individual systems to include a more complete evaluation of the consequences of such attacks in complex networks, where the results of an attack are highly affected by the architecture of the network. The modified FDNA tool models the direct effects and the cascading effect of disruptions of a system on its operability, as well as the effects of cyberattacks on communication links between systems. Preliminary results show that the method identifies the critical systems and the critical links with respect to their impact on the overall behavior, when cyberattacks occur. We also reported combined effects of internal disruptions and cyberattacks on communication links. The analysis of a littoral combat warfare SoS gives insight into possible modifications in the architecture, in order to mitigate the consequences of cyberattacks. Interpretation of the analysis of the impact of cyberattacks through FNDA results in guidelines for decisions on architecture and updates of a system-of-systems, in order to improve its resilience to cyberattacks.
Future improvement of this research will address two main points: first, we intend to refine the meaning of the inputs to the method (SOD, COD, AOD), both as the result of expert judgment, and using simulations and agent based models as test bed. Second, we propose to identify and formalize the steps and modifications to be applied to a given network, in order to increase its robustness and resilience to cyberattacks.
